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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant incorporates herein the statement of facts
contained in the Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief") and
challenges Appellee's factual statement insofar as it
contradicts or differs from Appellant•s factual statement.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.
The District Court's custody determinations were based
on improper factors and its Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law seek to support its unsupportable judgment.
The District Count's assessment of fault to the Appellant for
the failed marriage, its disdain for women who pursue
non-traditional interests, and its overwhelming distaste for
marital infidelity by women were the actual, overriding, and
improper reasons that Appellant was denied custody of her
children.
II.
At one point after the divorce, Appellee relinquished
custody of one of the minor children to Appellant. The
District Court glossed over that fact and gave it no weight in
its ruling on Appellant's petition seeking to gain custody of
all of her children.

The District Court also failed to address

the factors upon which Appellant relied to establish changed
circumstances.

The court's bias against women was again

evident in this process.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW SEEK TO JUSTIFY ITS ORDERS BY MINIMIZING THE
IMPROPER FACTORS UPON WHICH THE ORDERS WERE ACTUALLY
BASED.
It is evident upon any examination of the transcript
of the original divorce trial and the Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Supplemental Findings") that,
while the District Court, on remand, attempted to establish
justifiable grounds for its original custody order, the actual
reasons for the court's actions were based upon factors which
this Court has held are improper for consideration in a custody
dispute.
While there may be an evidentiary basis for some of
the District Court's Supplemental Findings, it is not
sufficient to justify the custody orders on appeal here when
the obvious reason for those orders was the District Court's
prejudice against women who pursue non-traditional interests.
It is proper for this Court to to review the District
Court's grounds for its original custody order because, on its
first remand of this case, this Court ordered the District
Court to supplement its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
with regard to its original order.

This Court cannot

adequately determine the validity and accuracy of the
Supplemental Findings without considering the grounds for the
original order by examining the trial transcript.
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The District Court applied two different sets of
standards to the parties in this action.

The standards applied

to Raymond rewarded him for working long hours in his business
(R, T-2, p. 58, 61) while the standards applied to LaRae
penalized her for her interests outside of the home.
(Supplemental Finding, No.6)

The District Court placed the

blame for the parties1 failed marriage directly and solely on
LaRae. (R, 238).

It failed to consider that the marriage had,

in all likelihood, failed before LaRae developed outside
interests.
LaRae.

It failed to address Raymond's sexual cruelty to

(R, T-3, p. 20.)

Raymond shares in the responsibility

for the marriage's failure.
Contrary to Appellee's assertion that the recent case
of Merriam vs. Merriam, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (1990), addressed
the issue of the District Court's bias against women, that
issue is not addressed in the Court of Appeals' decision.
Merriam, however, when examined in the context of the present
case and Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199 (Utah App. 1987),
reveals that the District Court apparently presents a no-win
situation to women involved in custody disputes.

In that case,

the District Court also granted custody of a minor child to the
father.

One factor which the court found significant in its

custody determination was that:
The Defendant's financial capabilities are
greater and more sound than that of the
Plaintiff because Plaintiff lacks specific
job related skills whereas Defendant has job
related skills.
-3-

Merriam at 34 (emphasis added).

Poor Mrs. Merriam.

If she had

taken the steps necessary to obtain those "job related skills"
she would have, alas, at the same time, "developed interests
outside the home" and would have undoubtedly been denied
custody for that reason.
The Appellee also wrongly asserts that the present
case is clearly distinguishable from Marchant, supra.

In fact,

the similarities between Marchant and the present case are
glaring.

In Marchant, the District Court's custody

determination was based upon what it perceived to be the wife's
"non-traditional activities" and, in effect, assessed her with
the blame for the breakdown of the marriage despite its finding
that the husband abused the wife both mentally and physically.
The court also overly emphasized the wife's moral indiscretion
committed, as in the present case, during the latter part of
the marriage when the marriage had already begun to fall
apart.

This Court found in Marchant that these considerations

were improper and reversed the District Court's Judgment.

This

Court should make the same finding in the present case.
POINT II
THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT IN
HER PETITION TO MODIFY WERE NEVER GRANTED THE
CONSIDERATION WHICH THEY DESERVE AND WHICH UTAH LAW
REQUIRES THAT THEY RECEIVE.
LaRae's Petition to modify the District Court's
custody award relied, to a great extent, on her changed
circumstances.

The District Court failed to address in even
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the most cursory manner the merit of those changes.

In Elmer

v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), the Court stated that:
[W]e have held that a change in the
circumstances of the noncustodial parent may
bear upon the issue of whether a change of
custody may be appropriate. (Citation
omitted.)
Elmer at 602.

If LaRae's changed circumstances "may bear" on

the issue, the District Court committed clear error when it
failed to consider or address those circumstances.
The District Court also ignored the implications of
Raymond's attempt to permanently relinquish custody of the
minor child, Josie, to LaRae's parents after he had already
given custody of the child to LaRae.

Appellee misstates the

circumstances of that event in an effort to minimize its
significance.

The fact that Raymond was prepared to give up

custody of Josie is significant and material to the custody
issue.

Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 88 (Utah 1982).

Appellee

would downplay this fact by maintaining, contrary to the
evidence, that he gave up custody of Josie only after
Savannah's tragic death when, in fact, he relinquished custody
of the child prior to the date of the accident.

(R, p. 241-

242) .
The District Court also failed to take heed of the
fact that Raymond gave up custody of Josie prior to Savannah's
death and granted Raymond the benefit of the excuse which he so
desperately needed for his relinquishment of custody, i.e.,
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that the time following Savannah's death was so stressful that
Raymond could not cope with the young child.

It should not be

overlooked that LaRae, whose emotional stability Appellee so
eagerly calls into doubt, was able to maintain her emotional
stability and provide critical emotional support to the
children under the very circumstances which Raymond maintains
rendered him incapable of caring for the children.
Finally, the significance of LaRae's changed
circumstances must be re-emphasized.

She has remarried and is

enjoying a relationship that is stable both economically and
emotionally.

Appellee, and the District Court for that matter,

downgrade the quality of that relationship by pointing out that
LaRae is now married to Randy Thorpe who, the District Court
asserts is Mthe guy she has the situation develop with. . . .w
(R, T-2, p. 115). There was never any evidence presented to
the Court that LaRae and Randy shared an intimate relationship
at any time prior to the divorce.

Even if the evidence had

established that such a relationship existed, LaRae's
subsequent marriage to Randy could only indicate that their
relationship was based on much more than a common sexual
interest.

The marriage is stable and LaRae can provide a

stable and nourishing environment for all of the children.
CONCLUSION
The District Court presents women a no-win situation.
If a woman pursues "outside interests," she will not be granted
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custody of her children because she has not followed the
traditional path of womanhood.

If she does not develop

marketable job-related skills outside of the home, she is less
capable than her spouse to care for the material needs of her
children and loses custody to the father for that reason.
It also appears that all a father desiring custody
need do to obtain custody is allege that the mother has been
unfaithful (the ambiguous allegation that she was "involved"
with another man is sufficient) during the marriage.

The

District Court will grant overwhelming weight to such an
allegation while apparently overlooking, in its child custody
determination, physical, emotional and sexual cruelty proven
against the father.
The District Court's Order on LaRae's Petition to
Modify cannot be upheld because the court did not consider all
of the changed circumstances which were relevant to a proper
determination of the Petition.

It also ignored the undisputed

facts in order to find, contrary to law, that Raymond's
relinquishment of Josie's custody was not relevant to the
custody issue.

The court apparently believed that LaRae's

alleged emotional instability made her unsuitable to receive
custody of the children and, at the same time, made excuses for
Raymond's emotional instability.
on her Petition to Modify.

LaRae deserves a fair hearing

She did not receive one below.
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While women can no longer expect greater consideration
in child custody cases, they certainly deserve equal
consideration.

The record in this case is clear.

LaRae did

not receive equal consideration because she faced an
insurmountable obstacle, the moral indignation of the court.
This court should overrule the District Court and grant the
relief requested in Appellant's Brief.
DATED this

A

}

day of February, 1991.
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
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Don R. Schow
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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